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MEDICAL DIAGNOSIS AS A GATEWAY TO THE CHILD WELFARE
SYSTEM: A LEGAL REVIEW
FOR PHYSICIANS, LAWYERS, AND
SOCIAL WORKERS
DR. DONALD BROSS*
I. THE CHILD WELFARE SYSTEM
A. Introduction
With 22% of American adults reporting that they were sexually
abused as children, and over 90% that they were subjected to corporal
punishment, it is virtually impossible for physicians to ignore the possi-
bility of child abuse in their practices. Either adults with a residual emo-
tional problem from child abuse, or children at risk today, will be seen in
the physician's practice, whatever his or her specialty. A once unknown
and undeveloped area, the recognition of child maltreatment has lead to
significant changes in medical, legal, and social service practice. This
article reviews some of the legal medical issues associated with child
maltreatment, especially as law and medicine are related to the child
welfare system. Whenever possible, practical, child-oriented guidance is
provided, including specific check lists. The objective of this article is to
help attorneys, social workers and physicians understand both the medi-
cal and legal dimensions of child maltreatment, and to illustrate how to
manage the documentation of medical, social, and legal information
necessary to identify and intervene in cases of child maltreatment.
A large number of American children are in contact with the child
welfare system.' Common reasons for intervention are: physical abuse;
sexual abuse; emotional deprivation; failure to provide medical care;
failure to provide adequate nutrition and stimulation; serious, incapaci-
tating physical or mental disability of the parent; and failure to provide a
safe home.2 Most reports do not lead to removing children from the
home, but as a result of many factors, only one of which is abuse, ap-
proximately 275,000 children are in foster care in the United States.
3
Maltreatment figures can be translated into a rate. In Colorado for ex-
ample, "[i]n 1984, out of every 10,000 Colorado children 12 and under,
89 were confirmed victims of some type of child abuse and/or neglect.
Associate Professor in Pediatricts, University of Colorado School of Medicine;
Legal Counsel, C. Henry Kempe National Center for the Prevention and Treatment of
Child Abuse and Neglect; B.A. 1964, Dartmouth College; M.S. 1971, University of Wis-
consin-Madison;J.D. 1975, University of Colorado School of Law; Ph.D. 1979, University
of Wisconsin-Madison.
1. In 1985, 1.9 million reports of child abuse or neglect were made in the U.S. 9
Youth L. News March 1988, at 23 (citing I Child Protection Exchange Oct. 1986 at 1).
2. Id. at 24.
3. 9 Youth L. News March 1988, at 5.
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Children are at greater risk of abuse and/or neglect than they are for
many traditional diseases of childhood."14 In 1984, this meant that 5381
out of 8640 (63%) of children reported for possible maltreatment were
confirmed as abused or neglected in Colorado. In order to respond to
these problems, physicians, social workers, and other care providers
must work together, whenever possible, to ensure children's welfare.
This article examines in sequence the basic legal principles gov-
erning the child protective services system, the legal framework for med-
ical diagnoses which can lead to reports of suspected child abuse or
neglect, the different types of medical care neglect which may be report-
able, and finally, the special medical-legal issues associated with children
in placement.
B. Parental Authority
The earliest documented views of parental authority particularly
relevant to American culture, are those shared with the 1800's British
common law. 5 Children were the property of their parents, particularly
their fathers. This attitude was an American import of English common
law values. Blackstone reported that while parents owed a duty to main-
tain, educate, and protect their children, it was a duty void of legal per-
suasion. In short, parents had free reign to rear their children,
unfettered by governmental restraints.
In contemporary readings, the Massachusetts Stubborn Child Law
of 1646 has come to epitomize this era. This law permitted parents, who
claimed that their child was "stubborn and rebellious" and "disobedient
of their voice" to seek a state reprimand. In Massachusetts, at least, that
reprimand could include capital punishment of the child. To a degree,
such absolute parental control reflected the reality of the family as a
work unit in an agrarian society.
6
Succeeding shifts in the official view of Americans toward children
coincide with shifting economic and social contingencies. Industrializa-
tion was accompanied by fears of truancy, delinquency, and perhaps, a
perceived need to rehabilitate or reduce abandoned and wayward
youth.7 The advent of juvenile courts in 1899 in Chicago and else-
where, also marked a beginning effort to help children. This third era of
"benevolence,"-8 gave way to recognition of "rights" for children with
the decision of In re Gault.9
These rights remain circumscribed, however. A strong presump-
tion in favor of parental rights continues, especially for younger chil-
4. Action Plan and Conference Proceedings, Colorado Action for Healthy People 43
(1986).




8. Id. at 4.
9. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
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dren. Parental authority over the secular education of children,' 0
religious training," mental health commitments of minors, 12 discipline
of children, and even the delegation of power to others to corporally
discipline children' 3 remains strong. Many state statutes governing par-
ent-child relations and child welfare contain language in the "purpose"
clause similar to the following:
[T]he purposes of this title are:
a) to secure for each child subject to these provisions such
care and guidance, preferably in his own home as will best
serve his welfare and interests in society;
b) to preserve and strengthen family ties whenever possible,
including improvement of the home environment;
c) to remove a child from the custody of his parents only
when his welfare and safety or protection of the public would
otherwise be endangered.
14
United States Supreme Court decisions clearly recognize that some
limitations on parental power exist. One case concerned the use of chil-
dren of about ten years of age, to hand out religious pamphlets late at
night, which a Massachusetts court found to be in violation of state child
labor laws. In upholding the Massachusetts law as not unduly restrictive
of the parents' first amendment rights of religious expression, the court
concluded:
It is cardinal with us that the custody, caring nurture of the
child reside first in the parents, whose primary function and
freedom include preparation for obligations the state can
neither supply nor hinder. But the family itself is not beyond
regulation in the public interest, as against a claim of religious
liberty. And neither rights of religion nor rights of parenthood
are beyond limitation. Acting to guard general interest and
youth's well-being, the state as parens patriae may restrict the
parent's control for requiring school attendance, regulating or
prohibiting the child's labor, and in many other ways.
15
C. Parens Patriae, Public Welfare, and Child Protective Services
Parens patriae is an historically significant phrase for activities un-
dertaken by society at large on behalf of incompetents. The historical
development of the concept of parens patriae was very well summarized
by Besharov as follows:
The term parens patriae, a Latin phrase, and translated literally
means 'father of his country.' The concept was apparently first
used by English Kings to justify the intervention in the lives of
the children of their vassals - children whose position and
10. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510
(1925).
11. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1970).
12. Parham v.J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979).
13. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977).
14. COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-10-102 (Supp. 1987) (emphasis added).
15. Wellesley v. Wellesley, II Bligh, N.S. 124, 4 Eng. Rep. 1078 (1828).
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property were of direct concern to the monarch. However, be-
cause the King justified his intervention by claiming to protect
children, the term grew to mean the sovereign's general obliga-
tion to look after the welfare of children in the Kingdom since
they were helpless. Thus, in 1828, the children of the Duke of
Wellesley were removed from him because of his dissolute be-
havior. When he was on the New York Court of Appeals, Chief
Justice Cardozo described the concept of parens patriae as a
responsibility to do 'what is best for the interest of the child.'
The judge is to put himself in the position of a 'wise, affection-
ate, and careful parent' and make provisions for the child
accordingly.
The concept today is used to refer to the state's obligation and right to
protect the young, the helpless, and the incompetent.'
6
The notion of parens patriae is in theory, and sometimes in prac-
tice, quite distinct from actions taken on behalf of the "public welfare."
The "public welfare" justification for state intrusions on personal mat-
ters, such as health care, is based on a need to protect the larger public
from an individual, rather than only to do what is good for that same
individual. Thus, a person may be ordered to receive an inoculation,
over his personal or religious objections, to reduce the spread of a con-
tagious disease.
Contemporary departments of protective services are a product of
several developments, but especially an American social invention, the
societies for prevention of cruelty to children. The first such society, the
New York Society for Prevention of Cruelty to Children (NYSPCC), can
be traced to the specific case of Mary Ellen in 1874.1 7 Intervention in
Mary Ellen's case was undertaken by Mrs. Etta Angell Wheeler, a New
York charity worker, and Henry Bergh, president, and Eldridge T.
Gerry, legal counsel, for the American Society for the Prevention of Cru-
elty to Animals. Many societies for the prevention of cruelty to children
were formed subsequently and based on the New York model.' 8 State
government efforts were also influenced by the NYSPCC approach.
While these issues of child and animal protection have been sepa-
rated in the minds of most, an occasional reminder of this old connec-
tion still occurs. 19 Federal influence on children's welfare became
institutionalized with the creation of the Children's Bureau in 1912.
16. D. BESHAROV, JUVENILE JUSTICE ADVOCACY: PRACTICE IN A UNIQUE COURT 2 n.5
(1974).
17. Hiner, Children's Rights, Corporal Punishment and Child Abuse: Changing American Atti-
tudes, 1870-1920, 43 BULL. MENINGER CLINIC 233-243 (1979).
18. Id. at 233-35.
19. For example, the American Humane Association, which has always had a chil-
dren's division and an animal division, recently appointed its first director with primary
experience in the child welfare field. It also decided to call its children's division the
American Association for the Protection of Children.
A recent Colorado Supreme Court case, dealing with cruelty to horses, is illustrative
of the difficulty of structuring children's rights. On appeal, defendant claimed that the
statute did not define "cruelty," and thus the statute was unconstitutionally vague. The
court stated that it had defined cruelty to children for years, and that cruelty to animals
was essentially the same. People v. Allen, 657 P.2d 447 (Colo. 1983).
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President William Howard Taft created the Children's Bureau on
April 9, 1912. He charged it to investigate and report infant mortality,
birth rates, orphanages, juvenile courts, employment, desertion, danger-
ous occupations, accidents, and diseases of children. 20 By 1984, a book
on children's rights had to recognize all of the following federal legisla-
tion to protect children, enacted just in the 1970's and 1980's: 2 1 The
Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980;22 Child Abuse and
Neglect Prevention and Treatment Act;2 3 Child Support Enforcement
Program; 24 Education for All Handicapped Children Act; 25 and the Fed-
eral Protection of Children Against Sexual Exploitation Act.2 6 Virtually
all of the federal laws listed in this non-inclusive summary can affect
state and local protection services by setting limits on their authority to
act or conditioning the payment of certain federal funds on compliance
with federal law.
Compliance with the large number of federal laws is just one aspect
of the changes required of the child protective services agencies in re-
cent years. State mandatory reporting laws demonstrate the extraordi-
nary extent of child maltreatment. Sensational cases have brought
public attention to problems of under-reaction and inappropriate inter-
vention. In a number of states, the legislatures have made it clear that
disciplines and agencies must share responsibilities, resources and coor-
dination in child protection by such activities as child protection teams.
Colorado law provides that:
It is the intent of the General Assembly to encourage the crea-
tion of one or more child protection teams in each county or
contiguous group of counties. In each county in which reports
of 50 or more incidents of known or suspected child abuse have
been made in the county department or the local law enforce-
ment agency in any one year, the county director shall cause a
child protection team to be inaugurated in the next following
year.
27
As a consequence of the law and encouragement of multidisciplinary
practice by the state department of protective services, Colorado by
1984 had nineteen required teams and twenty-three additional teams.
28
These teams increase the chances that all appropriate questions will be
raised in a case of child maltreatment, second opinions obtained, and
clear exposition of facts and alternatives presented to decision makers
including the courts.
20. Children's Bureau, Dep't of Health and Human Serv., D.C., 1912-1987, The Com-
mitment Continues 75 (1987).
21. See supra note 5.
22. 42 U.S.C. §§ 601, 620 & 670 (1982).
23. 42 U.S.C. § 5101 (1982).
24. 42 U.S.C. §§ 651-62 (1982).
25. 20 U.S.C. § 1400 (1982).
26. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251-53 (1982).
27. CoLo. REv. STAT. § 19-3-308(6)(a) (Supp. 1987).
28. Colorado's Community-Based Child Protection Teams, Colorado Department of
Social Services (1984).
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D. Legal Systems Which Relate to Child Welfare
Many different areas of the law apply to the question of child cus-
tody, care and treatment. For example, divorce brings many children's
lives before the courts at the instigation of parents. On occasion, allega-
tions of child abuse can bring the protective services agency to the case.
Children thought to be mentally ill by parents may be committed, if cer-
tain evidence is produced, for involuntary evaluation and treatment of
any existing condition.
Crimes against children can occur because of actions by individuals
outside the family as well as within. The decision to prosecute cannot be
made by citizens generally, but is made by an elected criminal prosecu-
tor. It is not unusual for other types of proceedings, such as divorce,
negligence, child welfare proceedings, or guardianship hearings to oc-
cur at the same time as a criminal prosecution if the victim is a child. In
subsequent discussions about the entitlement of children to certain
types of medical care or other services, the legal actions taken to secure
such care often would be considered "administrative law." While all of
these legal actions are necessary if the child's interests in life and prop-
erty are to be properly preserved, the most common proceeding is that
of dependency and neglect.
Dependency and neglect proceedings vary from state to state. Stat-
utory language and case law vary between jurisdictions in the United
States, the basic approach is generally similar. This brief survey uses
Colorado law as the primary example.
29
At the beginning of a dependency and neglect proceeding, a peti-
tion for court intervention names the parent or custodian of the child as
a "respondent" and not as a "defendant." The purpose of the depen-
dency or neglect proceeding is to adjudicate the status of the child as
one needing protection,3 0 not to accuse anyone. The "culpability" of
the parent is often not particularly relevant and the dependency and ne-
glect trial may not need to specify which caretaker is responsible for the
child's injury, sexual abuse, or deprivation. 3 ' This may become signifi-
cant at the disposition. Vague references to the child's best interest, or
improvement in the child's care is not enough to determine legally that a
29. Colorado also has an interesting history of child welfare laws. The concept of
juvenile court was developed independently in Colorado at about the same time the first
juvenile court was created in Chicago in 1899. In the words of one commentator, "while
the State of Illinois is generally credited with enacting the first state-wide codification of
juvenile law in 1899, Colorado's school law, enacted two months earlier, incorporated
essentially every feature of the Illinois juvenile court legislation." JOHNSON, INTRODUCTION
TO THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM 3 (1975).
In 1963, because of the influence of C. Henry Kempe, M.D., author of a book on
battered children and Chairman of the Department of Pediatrics of the University of Colo-
rado School of Medicine, Colorado was one of the first three states to enact mandatory
child abuse reporting legislation. In 1975, Colorado became the first state to mandate
child protection teams.
30. In re D.A.K., 198 Colo. 11, 596 P.2d (1979), appeal dismissed sub nom, J.K.S. v. Colo-
rado, 444 U.S. 987 (1979); In re O.E.P., 654 P.2d 312 (Colo. 1982).
31. In re P.D.S., 669 P.2d 627 (Colo. 1983).
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child is neglected. There must be clear findings of fact that the child is
receiving less than minimally adequate care. Colorado statutes provide
the following grounds for adjudicating that a child is dependent or
neglected:
A child is neglected or dependent if:
(a) A parent, guardian, or legal custodian has abandoned the
child or subjected him to mistreatment or abuse, or a parent,
guardian or legal custodian has suffered or allowed another to
mistreat or abuse the child without taking lawful means to stop
such mistreatment or abuse and prevent it from recurring;
(b) the child lacks proper parental care through the actions or
omissions of the parent, guardian or legal custodian;
(c) The child's environment is injurious to his welfare;
(d) A parent, guardian, or legal custodian fails or refuses to
provide the child with proper or necessary subsistence, educa-
tion, medical care or any other care necessary for his health,
guidance or well-being;
(e) The child is homeless, without proper care or not domi-
ciled with his parent, guardian, or legal custodian through no
fault of such parent, guardian, or legal custodian;
(f) The child has run away from home or is otherwise beyond
the control of his parent, guardian, or legal custodian.3
2
Examples of factual situations which elaborate our understanding of
the meaning of such language are discussed throughout the sections on
medical diagnoses which are gateways to the child welfare system.
States have provided due process protection for all involved in child
protection proceedings. For example, although the United States
Supreme Court has ruled that parents need not be given free legal coun-
sel in dependency and neglect cases,3 3 even in termination cases many
states grant this right by statute.3 4 The remedial nature of the depen-
dency and neglect process, its non-punitive approach, and the extreme
vulnerability of children to maltreatment, have led to procedures and
rules of evidence which favor allowing a complete picture of the child's
safety to be presented in court. In addition, the burden of proof in most
states, including Colorado, is neither beyond reasonable doubt, nor
clear and convincing evidence, but rather preponderance of the evi-
dence (that is, that it is more likely than not that the child is abused or
neglected).3 5 However, clear and convincing evidence is required for
termination of the parent-child legal relationship.
3 6
Although figures are not immediately available, it is clear that invol-
untary termination of the parent-child legal relationship is a very unu-
sual occurrence in most jurisdictions. Given divorce statistics based on
32. CoLO. REV. STAT. § 19-3-102 (1987).
33. Lassiter v. Department of Social Serv., 452 U.S. 18 (1981).
34. See CoLO. REV. STAT. § 19-1-106 (1987).
35. See CoLO. REV. STAT. § 19-3-106 (1987).
36. In re A.M.D., 648 P.2d 625, 631 (Colo. 1982) (following Santosky v. Kramer, 455
U.S. 745 (1982)). See also In re C.A.K., 652 P.2d 603 (Colo. 1982); In re M.S.H., 656 P.2d
1294 (Colo. 1983); In re S.T., 678 P.2d 1054 (Colo. App. 1983).
1988]
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"irreconcilable differences," which occur in one out of three marriages
in the United States, it is remarkable that so few situations of "irrecon-
cilable differences" occur between parents and children in a way that
leads to termination of the parent-child legal relationship. From a
child's perspective, however, the state is generally a terrible parent and
it makes sense for there to be a strong presumption in favor of maintain-
ing the biological unit. Thus, statutes providing for termination of the
parent-child legal relationship are very detailed and demanding. Colo-
rado statutes for termination require the following:
(1) The court may order a termination of the parent-child
legal relationship upon the finding of any one of the following:
(a) That the child has been abandoned by his parents as
set forth in Section 19-3-508(4);
(b) That the child is adjudicated dependent or neglected
and the court has found clear and convincing evidence that
no appropriate treatment plan can be devised to address
the unfitness of the parent or parents. In making such a
determination, the court shall find one of the following as a
basis for unfitness;
(I) Emotional illness, mental illness, or mental defi-
ciency of the parent of such duration or nature as to
render the parent unlikely within a reasonable time to
care for the ongoing physical, mental, and emotional
needs of the child;
(II) A single incident resulting in a gravely disabling
injury or disfigurement of the child;
(III) Long-term confinement of the parent of such
duration that he is not eligible for parole for at least
six years from the date the child was adjudicated de-
pendent or neglected;
(IV) Gravely disabling injury or death of a sibling
due to proven parental abuse or neglect; or
(c) That the child is adjudicated dependent or neglected
and all of the following exist:
(I) That an appropriate treatment plan approved by
the court has not been reasonably complied with by
the parent or parents or has not been found successful
or that the court has previously found, pursuant to
section 19-3-508(l)(e), that an appropriate treatment
plan could not be devised;
(II) That the parent is unfit;
(III) That the conduct or condition of the parent or
parents is unlikely to change within a reasonable
time.
3 7
The statute provides additional guidance and criteria on how to deter-
mine unfitness, conduct, or condition for purposes of section(c) (I) of the
statutory section cited.
38
Given that few cases end in termination, and that many cases do not
37. COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-3-604(1) (Supp. 1987).
38. See CoLo. REV. STAT. § 19-3-604(2) (Supp. 1987). For a discussion of the drafting
[Vol. 65:2-3
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result in even temporary loss of custody, most of the focus in protective
services law is on hearings concerning the immediate safety and treat-
ment needs of children and parents. Therefore, in view of the preven-
tive nature and intent of the child protection laws, it is not necessary to
wait for a child to be actually injured before the issuance of a protective
court order becomes possible. For example, injuries to another child
can be held to be relevant for establishing that a "dangerous environ-
ment" exists.3 9 While the parents may not have ajury during a termina-
tion hearing, a jury can be requested and must be provided in some
states, to determine whether or not a child has actually been abused or
neglected. The right to have ajury trial in dependency and neglect trials
is not granted by most states, just as divorces are not heard by juries.
Although ajury trial is expensive, it is often used to emphasize that child
care depends on community standards.
Therefore, the remainder of this article, addresses specific factual
situations concerning medical care of children and the protective serv-
ices system. The nature of childhood and children are important facts in
child maltreatment cases. The reason for statutes and procedures
which, though intricate, are rarely absolute, is to reflect the changing
nature of our beliefs and understanding about childhood. Yesterday's
beliefs about children are often viewed today as myth, and our views
today may be scorned in the future.40 For better" ' or for worse 4 2 there
is no doubt that medicine, especially from the pediatric perspective, is
important for helping understand what is likely to produce unacceptable
levels of harm to children.
II. MEDICAL CONDITIONS AND DIAGNOSES AS A GATEWAY TO THE CHILD
WELFARE SYSTEM
Physicians throughout the United States are now required to report
suspected child abuse and neglect. 43 Among the conditions specifically
reportable are suspected non-accidental trauma, sexual mistreatment,
deprivation of essential care, and medical care neglect.
A. Diagnosing, Documenting, and Reporting Suspected Maltreatment of
Children
One of the clearest legal principles in effect in the United States
today is the obligation of certain individuals, especially physicians, to
of the original termination statute and many of its provisions, see Bross, Termination of the
Parent-Child Legal Relationship in Colorado, 7 COLO. LAW. 362 (1978).
39. In re B.W., 626 P.2d 742 (Colo. App. 1981).
40. Melton, The Clashing of Symbols: Prelude to Child and Family Policy, 42 AM. PSYCHOLO-
GIST 345 (1987).
41. N. ELLERSTEIN, CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT: A MEDICAL REFERENCE (1981).
42. Newberger & Bourne, The Medicalization and Legalization of Child Abuse, 48 AM. J.
ORTHOPSYCHIATRY, 593 (1978).
43. CLEARINGHOUSE ON CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT, U.S. DEPT. HEALTH & HUMAN
SERV. (1985).
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report suspected child abuse and neglect. 44 There are two major incen-
tives for reporting: First, mandated reporters in all states who report in
good faith are immune from any civil or criminal liability which might
otherwise be incurred, such as suits for libel, slander, invasion of pri-
vacy, or breach of confidentiality. Furthermore, in the vast majority of
states, immunity extends to participation in judicial proceedings arising
from the reports.
4 5
The second incentive for reporting is that not reporting can have
serious consequences. Failure to diagnose, or to report, based on a rea-
sonable suspicion of abuse or neglect, has led to law suits and damage
awards in a number of states. 4 6 Comparable developments have oc-
curred under common law court decisions creating a duty of therapists
to report foreseeable harm to foreseeable victims. 4 7 In 1987, a meeting
of experts from such diverse groups as the American Bar Association,
American Enterprise Institute, and the American Public Welfare Associ-
ation concluded that few, if any, changes in law are needed with respect
to reporting, and only better clinical training and judgement are needed
to "fine tune" this aspect of child protective services. 4 8 Reporting laws
now are a well-established fixture of protective services in the United
States.
Reports typically are made to the protective services agency 4 9
although police can also be called. 50 "[R]easonable cause to know or
suspect that a child has been subjected to abuse or neglect" is enough to
require filing a report.5 1 Absolute proof is not required and may be
beyond a reporter's capacity to obtain. Statutory permission is given in
many states so that photographs of any visible trauma can be taken of a
child reasonably believed to be abused. Persons authorized to take pho-
tographs include child health associates, physicians, nurses, social work-
44. R. Horowitz, supra note 5, at 289.
45. Id.
46. Landeros v. Flood, 17 Cal. 3d 399, 551 P.2d 389, 131 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1976) (there
was liability for failure to diagnose and report child abuse); O'Keefe v. Osorio, No. 70 L-
14884 (Cook County Cir. Ct. July 24, 1984) (Illinois jury awarded plaintiff $186,851 be-
cause the doctor failed to comply with state reporting statute); Robison v. Wichal, No.
37607 (San Louis Obispo Co. Super. Ct. 1972) (suit against four doctors and police chief
who failed to report severely battered boy, settled out of court for $1,000,000). But see
Florida v. Groff, 409 So. 2d 44 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981). A psychiatrist's patient was
sexually abusing his daughter, and psychiatrist was aware of the abuse. The court did not
find the psychiatrist criminally liable for failure to report. This finding was based on a
narrow reading of the statute's intent. The statute was later amended to require psychia-
trists to report abuse. Austin v. French, No. 80-114(d) (E. Dist. Va. March 23, 1981) (out
of court settlement of $5,000 against doctor where doctor's report alleged to be in bad
faith).
47. Tarasoffv. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 17 Cal. 3d 425, 551 P.2d 334, 131 Cal. Rptr.
14 (1976); Brady v. Hopper, 570 F. Supp. 1333 (D. Colo. 1983), aff'd, 751 F.2d 329 (10th
Cir. 1984); McIntosh v. Milano, 168 N.J. Super. 466, 403 A.2d 500 (1979).
48. D. BESHAROV, CHILD ABUSE REPORTING AND INVESTIGATION: POLICY GUIDELINES
FOR DECISION MAKING (1988).
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ers, and local law enforcement officers. 5 2 If medically indicated, X-rays
can be taken or caused to be taken.
53
A physician who sees a child who may have been maltreated should
maintain records complete enough for the physician to feel comfortable
if called to court. This means that both the physical examination and
the history must be documented as contemporaneously as possible, in a
chronological, business-like manner. Krugman 54 has recently described
some of the important information to be obtained:
The recognition of physical abuse will hinge on the physician's
ability to differentiate accidental from non-accidental injury.
There is no absolutely reliable way to do this, but over 20 years
of clinical experience has resulted in experts in the field agree-
ing on the following diagnostic features of non-accidental
injury.
Discrepant history- This is one of the most common
and reliable features in the recognition of abused children.
The explanation of how the injury occurred does not fit the pat-
tern or severity of the medical findings. 'The baby rolled off
the couch' could not be an adequate explanation for bilateral
skull fractures. In fact, falls from 36 inches rarely result in seri-
ous injury. Similarly, histories that are partial, vague, or
change with time are commonly given by abusive caretakers.
Often, no history will be offered-the injury being a 'mystery.'
Delay in seeking care- Another common feature of
abuse cases, the delay in seeking care, may be weeks (in the
case of reoetgenogram showing an old fracture) or a shorter
time ('The baby hasn't been moving his right arm for two
days.'). In evaluating delay, the physician should contrast the
time it took abusive parents to seek care as to the more com-
mon situation of immediate, anxious calls from parents whose
children have suffered accidental injury.
Crisis- The abusive family has often had some stressful
crisis. It may be loss of a job, financial pressure from bills (we
have seen one infant die the day the $10,000 premature nurs-
ery bill arrived), or trivial (the noise of the washing machine).
It is a crisis to the adult and sets up the potentially abusive
situation.
Trigger- The child's contribution to the problem is to
do something to trigger the adult's violent response. In in-
fants, the most common trigger is crying-inconsolable, colicky
crying. In toddlers, a loss of bowel or bladder control most
often triggers a violent response. Other triggers include feed-
ing, sleeping, and discipline problems.
Unrealistic expectations of the child- Abusive parents
often have little knowledge of normal development and look to
the child to solve problems (for example, having a baby to
52. E.g., CoLo. REv. STAT. § 19-3-306 (Supp. 1987).
53. Id.
54. Krugman, Child Abuse and Neglect, The Role of the Primary Care Physician in Recognition,
Treatment and Prevention, 11 PRIMARY CARE 527, 528 (1984).
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bring two warring parents closer together) or to provide the
nurturance the parents never had as children.
Increasing severity of injuries- This is seen if there is no
intervention, assuming the first incident is not fatal. An open
warning may precede more serious abuse, such as bruises on
the buttocks of a one-month-old infant.
Abusive adult with history of being abused as child- In
our experience, nearly 100% of abusive adults have the com-
mon feature of being inadequately nurtured by their parents,
and most have been abused in the way they abuse their chil-
dren. In obtaining this history, it is not sufficient to ask, 'were
you abused as a child?' since many abusive adults will deny
their past. These grown-abused children will perceive that they
were 'bad' kids and 'got what they deserved.' When their chil-
dren do the same, they do what their parents did to them, thus
the abuse cycle continues.
It is important to note that not all abused children will
grow up to be abusive adults. We have seen many successful
parents and professionals who had terrible childhoods. Unfor-
tunately there are no studies to determine the probability of the
cycle repeating.
Isolation- The families involved in physical abuse are
often socially isolated, do not have many friends, move often,
and use many different hospitals and physicians.
Not all these features are found in all cases, although with
careful history and social evaluation, most will be present. 5 5
It is also important to be clear in documentation and in writing re-
ports. As an English pathologist once told his colleagues in training for
court, "Write short, declarative sentences, using words as simple as pos-
sible, and no jargon, always remembering that a lawyer may have to read
this!"
Whenever questions of how to document a case for legal purposes,
how to prepare for court, or the nature of a legal proceeding arise, spe-
cific information from a specialist attorney should be sought. Most phy-
sicians will eventually become comfortable with any child protection
proceedings that involve them if they are informed and supported in
their forensic roles. The following exposition of how to approach other
specific types of maltreatment from a legal prospective are just part of
the necessary background for comfort in dealing with the forensic as-
pects of child abuse and neglect. When a case is unclear, seeking opin-
ions from specialists and child protection teams should be standard
practice.
B. Non-accidental Trauma
Barton Schmitt, M.D., described five categories of child abuse in his
slide/tape series, "Visual Diagnosis of Non-accidental Trauma" pre-
55. Id.
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pared by the C. Henry Kempe National Center for the Prevention and
Treatment of Child Abuse and Neglect in Denver. These were bruises,
burns, internal injuries, skeletal injuries, and failure-to-thrive due to
underfeeding.
Colorado's child abuse reporting law includes specifically the fol-
lowing physical injuries as reportable:
[Elvidence of skin bruising, bleeding, malnutrition, failure to
thrive, burns, fracture of any bone, subdural hematoma, soft
tissue swelling, or death, [and] such condition or death is not
justifiably explained, [or where] the history given concerning
such condition is at variance with the degree or type of such
condition or death; or the circumstances indicate that such con-
dition may not be the product of an accidental occurrence. 56
A comprehensive reference on child abuse and neglect written in the
early 1980's includes chapters on central nervous system injuries,
ophthalmic manifestations of child abuse, bite marks and oral manifesta-
tions of child abuse and neglect, chest and abdominal injuries, burns as
signs of abuse, dermatologic manifestations of child abuse and neglect,
radiology of the skeletal system and internal injuries, and poisonings.
Corporal punishment is one source of non-accidental trauma. As of
1970, over 90% of all American adults had been subjected to corporal
punishment as children. 5 7 Corporal punishment can be an affirmative
defense to criminal charges 58 and to a dependency and neglect proceed-
ing.5 9 However, the point at which corporal punishment has become
excessive is a jury issue, and corporal punishment can be found to have
been excessive in both criminal 60 and civil6 1 trials. Children may also be
injured by corporal punishment in the schools, but with seven states
having abolished corporal punishment by 1985,62 violence caused by
discipline may be increasingly disfavored.
Statements of children and caretakers are a vital part of the medical
record and history in suspected child abuse cases. When a statement is
clearly false, the better course of action is simply to record the statement
accurately rather than question the speaker. While statements by par-
ents or children may be admissible in court under certain circumstances,
the statements are generally not admissible. The statements are impor-
tant in trying to understand whether a child's injuries could reasonably
have been accidental. Even though there are "profiles" of abusive par-
56. Slide Series by Barton Schmitt, M.D. (Prepared by University of Colorado, Den-
ver, C. Henry Kempe National Center for the Prevention and Treatment of Child Abuse
and Neglect).
57. N. Ellerstein, supra note 48.
58. Herman, A Statutory Proposal to Prohibit the Infliction of Violence upon Children, 19 FAM.
LAw Q. 112, 82 (1985).
59. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1-703(l)(a) (1986).
60. COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-3-303(l)(b) (Supp. 1987).
61. See People v. Taggart, 621 P.2d 1375 (Colo. 1981); In re M.A..L, 37 Colo. App.
307, 592 P.2d 415 (1976).
62. Herman, A Statutory Proposal to Prohibit Infliction of Violence upon Children, 19 FAM.
LAw 0. 112, 113 (1985).
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ents or "battering parent syndrome,"'63 neither science nor the law will
find abuse based primarily on a personality.
6 4
The battered child syndrome is not based on parental predisposi-
tions, but rather a deduction of what has been observed and cannot be
explained. Actions described by parents may or may not be consistent
with what is known about accidents to children and common results and
responses to accidents. Physicians are crucial as experts able to distin-
guish between various patterns of information based on examinations,
history, and laboratory results, and the likely explanation, etiology, or
diagnosis, given the constellation of data observed.
C. Sexual Abuse
Sexual abuse accounted for some 13% of child abuse reports re-
ceived nationally in 1983.65 In Colorado, 20% of the 6,811 confirmed
reports for fiscal year 1985 were "incest" cases and another 11% were
"third party" sexual abuse cases, 6 6 meaning that nearly one-third of all
confirmed cases involved sexual abuse to children. The large numbers
of sexual abuse cases documented to be occurring both within and
outside the family emphasize the importance of developing better ex-
pertise in handling this problem for children. Reporting of sexual abuse
includes cases in which a child is subjected to sexual assault or molesta-
tion, sexual exploitation or prostitution.
67
A physician's current list of behavioral indicators of possible sexual
abuse includes: Acute traumatic response, regression, sleeping distur-
bances, eating disorders, school problems, social problems and certain
behavioral sequelae. 6 8 These are not "diagnostic" of sexual abuse but
are consistent with a finding of sexual abuse. Other medical indicators
listed by the same physician are:
1. Males and Females- Bruises, scratches, bites, sexually
transmitted diseases; blood stains on underwear; bruising or
swelling of genital area not consistent with history; pain in anal,
genital, gastrointestinal and urinary areas; genital injuries (un-
explained, inconsistent); petechia; injury to lips; grasp marks;
encopresis; enuresis.
2. Males- Pain on urination; penile swelling; penile
discharge.
3. Females- Vaginal discharge; urethral inflammation;
lymph gland inflammation; pregnancy; recurrent atypical ab-
63. Michaels, Evidentiary Issues in Cases Involving Children in FOUNDATIONS OF CHILD AD-
VOCACY 101 (1987).
64. Brass & Kanee, Profiles, Syndromes and Pattern Evidence in Child Abuse and Neglect, in
REPRESENTING CHILDREN: CURRENT ISSUES IN LAW, MEDICINE, MENTAL HEALTH, AND PRO-
TECTIVE SERVICES (1987).
65. Colorado Dept. of Social Services, Reporting of Child Abuse to Colorado Central
Registry 22 (1986) (citing AHA Nationwide Summary Sheet, National Minimal Data Set
Report for 1984).
66. Id. at 13.
67. COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-3-303(l)(a)(II) (Supp. 1987).
68. Heger, Child Sexual Abuse The Medical Evaluation, in SEXUAL ABUSE ALLEGATIONS IN
CUSTODY AND VISITATION CASES 105, 108 (1988).
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dominal pain.6 9
The taking of history from a possibly sexually abused child is very
important, since not all cases of sexual abuse include physical signs, and
an estimated 6-8% of sexual abuse allegations are fabricated by an adult,
and an estimated 1-2% are fabricated by a child. 70 One of the most
widely accepted protocols for such interviews covers the following is-
sues: The predicament of the child (presentation, the effects of child
sexual abuse, victim psychology, the effect of the intervention system);
contribution of psychological research (developmental theory, chil-
dren's memory, knowledge of sex, the child as witness); preliminary con-
siderations (general principles, who should interview, the setting of the
interview, prior information, presence of parents, recording of the ses-
sion, investigation or evaluation?); the interview itself (starting the inter-
view, inquiring about sexual abuse, leading questions, language, the
young child, dealing with fear, methods to supplement inquiry, gather-
ing specific detail, behavioral observations, ending the session); process
of evaluation; suggested contents for an interviewing room; and aids to
the interviewer. 7 1 Not only the original material just cited, but other
new materials are also increasingly available for this rapidly developing
field.
72
For example, such issues as the use of anatomically correct dolls
and the use of videotapes of interviews as depositions, or in lieu of testi-
mony, is a complex and widely debated issue. 73 At this time, videotapes
are perhaps most useful in rebuttal to charges that an interview of a
child was inappropriate. In contrast, if the videotapes document poor
interviewing, efforts to establish the existence or non-existence of abuse
will be damaged. In exceptional circumstances, however, videotapes




Under this heading can be placed neglect of basic necessities, edu-
cational neglect, nutritional neglect, and emotional neglect. Medical
care might be placed here as well, but is treated separately in the follow-
ing section. Physicians are most likely to be called upon to diagnosis the
69. Id. at 109.
70. Jones & McGraw, Reliable and Fictitious Accounts of Sexual Abuse to Children, 2J. INTER-
PERSONAL VIOLENCE 27-45 (1987); Sink, Studies of True and False Allegations: A Critical Re-
view, in SEXUAL ABUSE ALLEGATIONS IN CUSTODY AND VISITATION CASES, supra note 75, at
37-40.
71. D. JONES & M. MCQUISTON, INTERVIEWING THE SEXUALLY ABUSED CHILD (2d ed.
1985).
72. See D. FINKELHOR, A SOURCEBOOK ON CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE (1986); K. McFARLANE,
SEXUAL ABUSE OF YOUNG CHILDREN (1986); Krugman, Recognition of Sexual Abuse in Children,
8 PEDIATRICS IN REVIEW 25 (1986).
73. See Freeman & Estrada-Mullaney, Interviewing Children Using Anatomical Dolls: Tips,
Techniques and Problems, in ACHIEVING CHANGE FOR CHILDREN: LITIGATION, LEGISLATION
AND TREATMENT, 55-74 (1988).
74. Jones & Krugman, Can a Three-Year-Old Child Bear Witness to Her Sexual Assault and
Attempted Murder? 10 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 253 (1986).
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nature of growth failure or non-organic failure to thrive. 75 This diagno-
sis has been recognized by the courts:
7 6
More generally, neglect is at least as pervasive as abuse and is
especially salient to child development. There are many vari-
eties of deprivation, but because neglect is marked by the ab-
sence of needed care, it is difficult to define and to alter.
Poverty alone is not a sufficient basis for adjudicating neglect.
Failure to provide necessary food, shelter, or clothing can,
however, be evidence of generally improper parental care and
custody. Even with minimal income, most parents love and
care for their children in at least adequate fashion, and some
parents provide astonishing care in the face of the most strin-
gent conditions. Other parents, even with support in the form
of Aid to Families with Dependent Children, help in finding
jobs, assistance with food and shelter by churches or other pub-
lic agencies, do not meet their children's minimal needs. Love,
affection, and emotional consistency and support can be pro-
vided by the poorest parents and courts seem universally to
have recognized the distinction between an economic and emo-
tional impoverishment. Thus, frequent housing moves, school
changes and job changes can be associated with poverty, or
with chaotic and impulse-ridden behavior independent of eco-
nomic circumstances.
77
Normally necessary for full understanding of neglect situations, es-
pecially where the effects are seen in developmental delays, are evalua-
tions of children at different times in different settings. The comparison
of "baseline" findings of growth and behavior with subsequent develop-
mental states following placement in a different environment, but with
the same nutritional support, is a classic way of evaluating the effects of
emotional deprivation. This is just one major reason why children who
are removed from a home, and perhaps even a foster home, should re-
ceive thorough evaluations. New techniques, using videotapes of par-
ent-child interactions, hold promise of quicker and more accurate
evaluation and treatment of certain types of emotional deprivation. For
example, problems of benign neglect, incoordination, and overt hostility
have all been observed in relationships of mothers and babies who were
diagnosed as non-organic failure to thrive children.
78
III. MEDICAL CARE NEGLECT AND MISUSE OF MEDICAL CARE
Children's rights to medical care do not, of course, guarantee that a
75. See Whitten, Growth Failure, in CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT: A MEDICAL REFERENCE,
197-220 (1981).
76. In re E.S., 681 P.2d 528 (Colo. App. 1984), Daugaard v. People, 176 Colo. 38,488
P.2d 1101 (1971); In re M.M., 184 Colo. 298, 520 P.2d 128 (1974), appeal after remand, 188
Colo. 199, 533 P.2d 913 (1975); In re C.O., 36 Colo. App. 298, 541 P.2d 330 (1975).
77. Bross, Defining Child Abuse and Neglect from a Legal Perspective, in FOUNDATIONS OF
CHILD ADVOCACY, 71 (1987).
78. See Haynes, Cutler, Gray & Kempe, Hospitalized Cases of Nonorganic Failure to Thrive:
The Scope of the Problem and Short-term Lay Health Visitor Intervention, 8 CHILD ABUSE & NE-
GLE CT 229 (1984); Fraser, The Pediatric Bill of Rights, 16 S. Tx. L.J. 245 (1975).
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child will receive medical care.7 9 The unevenness with which medical
resources are made available is a significant reason for many children
not receiving care. For example, in Colorado in 1986, seventeen Colo-
rado counties reported there were no private providers of prenatal or
delivery services. Thirteen of these counties reported no public health
care, and ten of the counties had no prenatal or delivery service options
for low income women. 80 With 22% of babies born in Colorado in 1986
to women who received late or no prenatal care,8 ' there are clearly sys-
temic problems in the delivery of health services to children. On the
other hand, even when medical services are available, sometimes at no
cost to a caretaker, parents may refuse to obtain or accept care for their
children. The reasons include religious principles, personal preference,
and misunderstanding.
A. General Principles for Deciding Unacceptable
Medical Care Neglect
At whatever point child medical care neglect occurs, from the pre-
natal period to the individual's emancipation, some questions should be
answered specifically. These questions include whether full informed
consent procedures have been followed with the parents and the child.
Will delay increase the probability of harm? Is the treatment well-recog-
nized, non-controversial, and generally accepted? Is the probability of
success fairly high? Are the negative consequences unlikely and are
these consequences minimal in severity? Are there any reasonable alter-
natives? 8 2 These factors, weighed by the court, are discussed below.
Confusion about what is being proposed medically for a child is
probably a factor in a significant number of cases which appear to be
medical care neglect. The malpractice litigation of the 1970's estab-
lished the principle that doctors in the United States must tell patients
what a reasonably prudent patient under similar circumstances would
wish to know before consenting to the proposed care. 83 Medical care
options can be difficult to understand, especially when individuals are
under stress. The parent, and a mature enough child, must know what
the consequences of non-treatment will be, and with what probability
these consequences will occur. What discomforts and risks are in-
volved? Can the procedure wait? And what alternatives are there to the
proposed procedure? What consequences will occur, that is, things that
will occur and are not a mere possibility, even if the best results are
obtained? These are the same factors, not surprisingly, which the courts
79. Declaration of the Rights of the Child, United Nations Doc. (1959).
80. 4 COLORADO CHILDREN'S CAMPAIGN REPORT 1 (1988).
81. Id.
82. Bross, Medical Care Neglect, 6 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 375 (1982).
83. See Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064
(1972); Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505, 502 P.2d 1 (1972); Cooper v.
Roberts, 220 Pa. Super. 260, 286 A.2d 647 (1971); Wilkson v. Vesey, 110 R.I. 606, 295
A.2d 676 (1972); Trogun v. Fruchtman, 58 Wis. 2d 569, 207 N.W.2d 297 (1973).
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will wish to have known before considering a petition to override paren-
tal judgment on behalf of the child.
Virtually every court will order treatment necessary to save a child's
life, 84 absent a possible right to die situation. It is unclear if courts will
order treatment to prevent a severely disabling condition or injury. The
most recent Colorado decisions, involving non-criminal aspects of medi-
cal care neglect, reveal some of this confusion. In In re D.L.E. ,85 D.L.E.
suffered a seizure disorder, which at the age of twelve years appeared to
be growing worse, and for which a physician had prescribed Dilantin.
The concern was that without the anti-seizure medication, the child
would suffer more seizures with a greater risk of major central nervous
system damage. The boy's father had died previously and D.L.E. was
then adopted by the local church head. The local department of social
services went to court to seek an order to require that the boy be placed
on Dilantin. There are risks and side effects with Dilantin-the pre-
scribed drug, but the parents' reason for refusing the treatment was that
they were members of a religion which followed the belief that no medi-
cal care should be given. The trial court heard evidence from the family
and the attending physician and issued an order for the medication to be
taken. The parents appealed the trial court's decision (D.L.E. I).86
After the trial court ordered the treatment over parental objections,
the Colorado Supreme Court reversed because, "[a]lthough the trial
court found that D.L.E.'s life would be in danger if he did not receive
treatment, there is no support in the record for this conclusion." The
Colorado Supreme Court's emphasis on life-saving medical care as the
threshold for allowing a court order of medical care is interesting in
view of one of the opening citations in the D.L.E. I decision: "We recog-
nize that the United States has placed a heavy burden upon the state and
the courts to justify any infringement of an individual's first amendment
freedoms." As Judge Dreier aptly stated in Muhlenberg Hospital v. Patter-
son,8 7 "[t]he Courts have been and will continue to be the guardian of
the religious rights of the individuals to see ... the power of the State is
not exercised beyond the area where treatment is necessary for the sus-
taining of life or the prevention of grievous bodily injury." The decision
of D.L.E. I was not the end of the matter. The Colorado Supreme Court
would hear the matter of D.L.E. again (D.L.E. II).88
The Colorado court's words in D.L.E.II best summarize what
transpired:
D.L.E. initially complied with the orders relating to medical
treatment, but on May 2, 1980, while the appeal in D.L.E. I was
84. See State V. Perricone, 37 N.J. 463, 181 A.2d 751 (1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 890
(1962); People v. Labrenz, 411 111. 618, 104 N.E.2d 769 (1952), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 824;
Morrison v. State, 252 S.W.2d 97 (Mo. 1952); Jehovah's Witnesses v. King County Hosp.,
278 F. Supp. 488 (D.C. Wash. 1967), aft'd, 390 U.S. 598 (1968).
85. In re D.L.E., 200 Colo 244, 614 P.2d 873 (1980) [hereinafter D.L.E. I].
86. Id. at 225, 614 P.2d at 874.
87. 128 NJ. Super. 498, 320 A.2d 518 (1974).
88. In re D.L.E. Colo. Law. 1993 (1982) [hereinafter D.L.E. II],
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pending, and contrary to medical advice, he abruptly stopped
taking Dilantin. As a result, he went into a state of status
epilepticus with resulting dysfunction, including a stroke which
caused permanent, flaccid paralysis of his left arm and leg, a
nerve injury which restricted movement in his right arm, a dis-
located jaw, and continued seizure activity.
* * * At a hearing in the district court on June 12, 1980,
a physician testified that if D.L.E. suffered a focal seizure while
eating, there was a reasonable medical probability that he
would choke. The court found that continuing focal seizures
could result in a life-threatening situation and therefore or-
dered D.L.E. to resume taking his medication. During pen-
dency of the appeal of D.L.E. I we were not advised of D.L.E.'s
changed condition and the precipitating factors which led to his
grand mal seizures. Therefore, as a result of our own decision
in D.L.E. I the order of the district court was voided.
8 9
One way to distinguish D.L.E. I and D.L.E. H is to observe that in
D.L.E. II there was clear medical testimony about the nature of the risk
of death, meaning that the Supreme Court could refuse to uphold an
order of treatment over parental objections in the first case based on no
proven likelihood of imminent death. The Supreme Court could then
consistently order treatment over objection in the second instance be-
cause imminent death had become a probability.
Another possible distinction is the court's better understanding in
D.L.E. II of the nature of the risks originally involved for D.L.E. To ana-
lyze these sequential decisions otherwise, is to conclude that the even-
tual injuries to D.L.E. were thus not considered severe enough, in and of
themselves, to try to prevent by ordering medication, although once the
injuries had occurred, D.L.E.'s life had to be sustained over objec-
tions.9 0 While it is unclear at this time, the Colorado Supreme Court
cites with approval a case holding that medical care may be ordered for
"the prevention of grievous bodily injury." This appears to represent
the better rule.9 ' As further discussed below, there are many factors
other than imminent death versus grievous bodily injury which should
be weighed, and all these factors taken together are a better guide for
properly balancing the rights involved.
Another consideration in D.L.E.'s situation was whether or not the
issue of religious belief clouded other, major issues in the case. The
pervasive influence of religious considerations in D.L.E. I and II high-
lights concerns raised about statutes such as the following part of Colo-
rado's child protection code:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this article, no child
89. Id.
90. If an individual is severely injured, the courts may recognize his "right to die." See
In re Hector 0. Rodas, No. 86, slip. op. at 139 (Colo. Dist. Ct., Grand County, April 3,
1987).
91. See also In re Philip B., 92 Cal. App. 3d 796, 156 Cal. Rptr. 48 (1979), cert. denied,
445 U.S. 949 (1980); In re Cicero, 101 Misc. 2d 699, 421 N.Y.S.2d 965 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1979).
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who in good faith is under treatment solely by spiritual means
through prayer in accordance with the tenets and practices of a
recognized church or religious denomination by duly accred-
ited practitioner thereof shall, for that reason alone, be consid-
ered to have been neglected within the purview of this article.
92
On its face, such a statute may seem to offer little reason for objec-
tion. Among the problems it presents, however, is confusion for
mandatory reporters who suspect child medical care neglect and who
may be required to report suspected neglect notwithstanding any reli-
gious objection. 9 3 If a child is dying, it is generally not because of faith
healing, but because of an illness. Faith healing is not the issue, but a
medically preventable death is. Confusion can also be caused for those
who permit a child to die in the mistaken notion that such a statutory
clause relieves them of the parental duty to seek medical care for a child
in extremis, notwithstanding their beliefs. 94 From a child's perspective,
such clauses arguably violate the equal protection clause of the United
States Constitution in having the practical effect of denying them equal
access to available medical care based only on the beliefs of a caretaker.
The chilling effect on child protection efforts by such language arguably
deprives children of due process under the Constitution as well. A bet-
ter approach from a child's perspective would be language to the effect
that "no child shall be denied life-saving medical care or care necessary
to prevent or ameliorate serious disabilities merely because of the reli-
gious beliefs of the parent or caretaker." This would be a more accurate
reflection of the current state of American case law. In fact, if there is
92. COLO. REv. STAT. § 19-3-103 (Supp. 1987).
93. Walker v. Superior Court of Sacramento, No. 24693 (Ct. App., 3d Dist. Jan. 10,
1986).
94. In 1988, after two years of study, the American Academy of Pediatrics adopted the
following statement:
The Committee on Bioethics asserts that (1) the opportunity to grow and
develop safe from physical harm with the protection of our society is a fundamen-
tal right of every child; (2) the basic moral principles of justice and of protection
of children as vulnerable citizens require that all parents and caretakers must be
treated equally by the laws and regulations that have been enacted by state and
federal governments to protect children; (3) all child abuse, neglect, and medical
neglect statutes should be applied without potential or actual exemption for reli-
gious beliefs; (4) no statute should exist that permits or implies that denial of
medical care necessary to prevent death or serious impairment to children can be
supported on religious grounds; (5) state legislatures and regulatory agencies
with interests in children should be urged to remove religious exemption clauses
from statutes and regulations.
It is not the intent of the Committee to encourage the development of sepa-
rate legal systems to respond to parents who abuse or neglect their children for
religious or philosophical reasons. The usual procedures of detection, reporting,
and remediation by established civil or criminal court processes are, in most juris-
dictions, sufficiently developed and functional. Rather, it is the Committee's con-
cern that those procedures designed to help children who are victims of their
caretakers and to prevent neglect be applied evenly to all caretakers. Claims of
exemption from responsibility for care-as defined above-should not be treated
more or less stringently than those who make no such claim. The Committee
does not intend by this statement to advocate punishment of offending parents as
a solution to the problem of child abuse and neglect, but rather we are calling for
equal treatment of all abusive parents.
AMERICAN ACADEMY OF PEDIATRICS, COMMITrEE ON BIOETHICS (1988).
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good and sufficient reason, every parent should be able to refuse medi-
cal treatment for a child regardless of religious belief. To approach the
problem otherwise is to irreversibly confuse secular science and reli-
gion, an approach rejected by the Constitution. Many court decisions
have supported or rejected arguments to override parental judgment,
when religious beliefs were not even an issue, based on other factors.
Courts generally will not order treatment if it is possible to wait until the
child is old enough to decide.9 5 If a treatment has at least a 50/50
chance of succeeding 96 the court will be more likely to order treatment
than when the chances become more uncertain.9 7 Conflicting medical
opinions make the court's role more difficult and the results less predict-
able, 98 whereas uniformity of opinions make a court order overriding
parental objections more likely. 99
The case of D.L.E. is important for the reason that it shows that a
belief need not be religiously based to be considered and given full
weight. Faced with ordering medical care for a twelve-year-old boy with
a congenital harelip and cleft palate, the court in the case of In re
Seiforth 100 concluded that it had jurisdiction, and ordered that the boy
receive counseling. However, "the court refused to order surgery, not
because it thought it lacked authority, but because it thought the boy's
reluctance to have surgery foretold an unwillingness to participate in
therapy following the operation." This decision could be seen as pri-
marily reflecting the court's willingness to consider the right of a mature
enough child to have some influence on the decision, or as reflecting the
court's sensitivity to the need for active patient cooperation, or both.
Another way of looking at the decisions made in the situation of D.L.E.
is to consider how important active cooperation and involvement of the
patient will have to be for success. Not clearly discussed in D.L.E.'s situ-
ation was the chronicity of his condition. D.L.E. would have to continue
to take the medicine "faithfully," with sudden withdrawal more risky, it
appears, than never having taken the medicine in the first place. D.L.E.
helps teach us that court-ordered care of children with chronic condi-
tions is especially problematic. Enough children have diabetes, sickle
cell anemia, or asthma for some to also experience inadequate parental
care, and for situations to occur in which parents and children effectively
give up on some aspect of necessary care.
The probable consequences of inadequate care and self-care, espe-
cially in adolescence, have been documented for asthma, with death be-
ing one apparent result.' 0 ' The difficulty is that a child may become so
resistant that there is no reasonable way to require the medication.
95. In re Hudson, 13 Wash. 2d 673, 126 P.2d 765 (1942); Mitchell v. Davis, 205
S.W.2d 812 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947); In re Seiferth, 309 N.Y. 80, 127 N.E.2d 820 (1955).
96. In re Vasko, 238 A.D. 128, 263 N.Y.S. 552 (N.Y. App. Div. 1933).
97. In re Tuttendario, 21 Pa. Dist. 501 (1911).
98. In re Hofbauer, 65 A.D.2d 108, 411 N.Y.S.2d 416 (N.Y. App. Div. 1978).
99. See In re Minor, 375 Mass. 733, 379 N.E.2d 1053 (1978).
100. 309 N.Y. 80, 127 N.E.2d 820 (1955); In re Green, 448 Pa. 338, 292 A.2d 387
(1972), appeal after remand, 452 Pa. 373, 307 A.2d 279 (1973).
101. Strunk, Mrazek, Wolfson-Fuhrman, & La Breque, Physiologic and Psychological Char-
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Based on all of these considerations, a court might refuse to order medi-
cal care for a particularly mature or particularly resistant older child.
Yet the same court might consider and order termination of the parent-
child relationship for a very young child whose parents refuse to follow
the court order.
The factors which should be considered in typical cases of child
medical care neglect can be Summarized as follows:
1. Full informed consent procedures should have been followed
and information from that process should have been presented;
2. The greater the likelihood of death or serious bodily injury the
greater the justification for overriding parental objections;
3. To the extent that delay increases the probability of harm, the
court should be more willing to override parental objections;
4. A well-established, universally accepted treatment should have
a greater chance of being ordered than less accepted or experimental
treatments;
5. The higher the probability of success the more willing the
court should be to override objections;
6. The fewer the negative consequences and the less likely the
negative consequences, the more willing the court should be to override
objections;
7. The greater the likelihood that a child will have a high quality,
full life-span or normal life in other respects, the more likely the court
should be to override objections;
8. If the child consents to care, especially as the child matures,
the court should be more willing to override parental objections;
9. The court should be assured that no alternative will provide
better, more probable benefit;
10. The court should consider whether the chronicity of the illness
will diminish or undermine the effectiveness of any court order;
11. No child should be denied medical care only because of a reli-
gious or belief-based objection by parents, but the court should con-
sider the degree to which beliefs held by the parent or child will
inevitably sabotage any prospects for effective care.
B. Prenatal Care and Abuse of Children
Medical care neglect issues become more complicated as the
problems of prenatal neglect are considered. Medical professionals and
corporations have been held liable for acts of negligence taking place,
even before conception, which later caused harm to children. 10 2 Mater-
acteristics Associated with Death Due to Asthma in Childhood, 259 J. Am. MED. A. 1193-1198
(1985).
102. Renslow v. Mennonite Hosp., 40 Il1. App. 3d 234, 351 N.E.2d 870 (1976) (wrong
blood type used during blood transfusion); Jorgensen v. Meade Johnson Laboratories,
Inc., 483 F.2d 237 (10th Cir. 1973) (chromosomal damage caused by birth control pills);
Bergstresser v. Mitchell, 577 F.2d 22 (8th Cir. 1978) (an improper suture following a C-
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nal accountability for avoidable harms to children in utero is a more
complicated issue than professional or agency liability in part because
constitutional rights are generally invoked in presentations of possible
parental neglect during pregnancy. Another reason for complexity is
the greater uncertainty regarding relationships between parental behav-
ior generally and the etiology of defects. The threshold legal questions
are whether the Constitution prevents intervention on behalf of the un-
born and whether the laws of a particular state recognize a child not yet
born for purposes of child protection.
In the well-known decision of Roe v. Wade,' 0 3 the "abortion deci-
sion," the Supreme Court ruled that once termination of pregnancy is
more dangerous than carrying a child to term, and once a fetus is viable,
some type of intervention might be possible. With respect to the State's
important and legitimate interest in potential life, the "compelling"
point is at viability. This is so because the fetus then presumably has the
capability of meaningful life outside the mother's womb. State regula-
tion protecting the fetal life after viability thus has both logical and bio-
logical justification. If the state is interested in protecting fetal life after
viability it may go so far as to proscribe abortion during that period
when it is necessary to preserve the life of the mother.
10 4
A number of courts have now ordered intervention on behalf of the
child, finding no constitutional obstacle on the factual situations
presented in those cases and also finding that the state child protection
statute extended, at least in those individual instances, to the time
before birth. In the cases thus far, interventions ordered included blood
transfusions,' 0 5 amniocentesis, drug therapy, blood tests, and fetal heart
monitoring for a placenta previa,' 0 6 and caesarian sections. 10 7 While
the results of most of these cases were completely positive for both
mother and child, in a recent case both a mother, with a fatal terminal
cancer, and the baby died.' 0 8
Given the difficulty of this area, a recent medical review concluded
as follows:
State intervention to protect fetal health may be viewed as con-
sistent with the logic supporting basic principles of manage-
ment of child abuse and neglect. However, the unique biologic
and psychologic aspects of fetal-maternal unit, the greater in-
trusiveness required for effective surveillance and control, and
the uncertainty of intrauterine diagnostic and prognostic pre-
section led to acute rupture of the uterus and caused brain damage to the later-born
child).
103. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
104. Id. at 163.
105. Raleigh Fitkin-Paul Morgan Mem. Hosp. v. Anderson, 42 NJ. 421, 201 A.2d 537
(N.J. 1964), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 985 (1964).
106. Brigham and Women's Hosp. v. Brit, No. 84532, (Suffolk Super. Ct. July 16,
1986).
107. SeeJefferson v. Griffin Spalding County Hosp. Auth., 267 Ga. 86, 274 S.E.2d 457
(1981). See also Bowes, & Selgestad, Fetal v. Material Rights: Medical and Legal Perspectives, 58
AM. J. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 209 (1981).
108. In re A. C., No. 87-609 (D.C. Ct. App. June 16, 1987).
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dictability should prompt restraint in completing the analogy.
Pediatricians should advocate the middle ground between the
polar views that until the moment of birth only the mother's
legal interests should be recognized and, at the opposite ex-
treme, that the pregnant woman is merely a vessel for the incu-
bating egg and subordinate to the fetus. The reach of state
child protection authority should be constrained when applied
to the at-risk fetus. State intervention to protect fetal health
should be considered only when (1) there is a high likelihood of
serious fetal disease, (2) there is a high level of diagnostic and
prognostic accuracy, (3) there is strong scientific evidence that
the proposed treatment is efficacious, (4) deferring interven-
tion until after birth could cause significant further damage,
(5) the risk to the mother is minimal, (6) interference with ma-
ternal privacy is not egregious, and (7) attempts at persuasion,
education, and obtaining informed consent have been
exhausted. ' 0 9
From a legal perspective, there are a number of steps which might
be considered in decending order, based on the principle that the least
restrictive alternative in limiting maternal rights should be followed:
1. Documenting prenatal behavior harmful to the child as a
method of establishing a syndrome or pattern of conduct justifying im-
mediate court action as soon as the child is born;
2. Asking the court to take jurisdiction over the unborn child, and
appointing a guardian ad litem for the unborn child;
3. Asking the court to order a social services evaluation of the
family;
4. Asking the court to order a medical or psychiatric examination
of the mother;
5. Asking the court to order a medical regimen following the ap-
plication of informed consent principles and considering primarily pro-
cedures benign or beneficial to the mother;
6. Asking the court to order fetal monitoring by surgical means or
other surgical intervention if and only if relatively benign and it has a
high probability of saving the child;
7. Seeking the most restrictive alternative only as a last resort; i.e.,
seeking an order of confinement. Involuntary confinement or restric-
tion of physical activities creates special problems of right to freedom,
travel, and special concerns of due process under the law.'l°
Another possible source of harms to children not yet born can be
exposure to either illegal or legal drugs as discussed in the following
section.
109. Landwirth, Fetal Abuse and Neglect: An Emerging Controversy, 79 PEDIATRICS 508
(1987).
110. Bross, Court-Ordered Intervention on Behalf of Unborn Children, 7 CHILDREN'S LEGAL
RTS. J. 11 (1986); Bross & Meredyth, Neglect of the Unborn Child: An Analysis Based on Law in
the United States, 3 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 643 (1979).
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C. Prenatal Drug Exposure"I I
Drugs, both legal and illegal, are becoming a more pervasive social
and medical concern. Thus it is inevitable that the issue of child protec-
tion will accompany the use of illegal drugs, and that child protection
concerns must be considered in cases where legal or prescription drugs
are used in a way that endangers a child. In the discussion that follows,
law from outside Colorado is used because such cases have not yet
reached the Colorado appellate courts. This discussion focuses on the
period before and just after birth (the perinatal period) because it is dur-
ing this period that parental drug use is most problematic.
VI. INTERVENTION BASED ON SYMPTOMATIC OR OBSERVED
HARM TO A CHILD
A child may have documented signs and symptoms of the effects of
prenatal drug exposure, or the child may be asymptomatic. Prenatally,
it may be possible only to estimate the degree of risk to the child.
Postnatally a child may be at substantial risk of harm not only because of
the direct effects of a drug, but also because the parent's conduct or
condition creates a dangerous environment. Finally, a child may have
been harmed without a current means to diagnose the harm, but there
may be indications of a continuing need to observe the child over time
before the effects of the harm will be detectable.
A. Child's Addiction as Evidence of Abuse
Withdrawal symptoms can include "preconvulsive tremors, hyper-
activity, incessant crying, ravenousness alternating with vomiting" and,
if untreated, severe convulsions and even death. One commentator has
suggested that a baby suffering from such symptoms could well be con-
sidered to be an abused child since such conditions fall within the realm
of "serious physical injury."' 12
Subjecting a child to drug addiction, withdrawal symptoms, and
other physical injuries can certainly be considered a substantial risk of
harm to the infant's health or welfare under many state statutes, even
though most states, including Colorado, do not have specific statutes
dealing with prenatal drug exposure.
B. Causality
To the extent that an action is taken based on symptomatic or ob-
served harm, a crucial question will be the extent to which actual causa-
tion, or a direct relationship between the symptoms observed and the
drug taken, can be established. This is especially true if the only basis
for intervention is based on drug exposure. Moreover, it may be neces-
111. This section is taken from protocols prepared for the State of Oregon by the
National Association of Counsel for Children, and is reprinted as modified with
permission.
112. N.Y. Fain Ct. Act § 1012 (McKinney 1983).
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sary to show that the individual was aware of the potential detriment to
the child, if this is not self-evident.
C. Severity of Drug Used
The medical literature is replete with information regarding the
harm caused to some children when mothers take drugs during preg-
nancy.' 13 The tragedy resulting from pregnant women who used
thalidomide points out the disabling deformities which may occur. The
severe birth defects which occurred resulted in international concern
about the evaluation and use of drugs."
1 4
It is apparent that the ingestion of different chemicals will have va-
rying effects on the fetus. For example, smoking cigarettes has been
statistically linked to premature babies and low birth weights. However,
use of heroin or cocaine may be much more dangerous to the unborn
child, with possible results of growth retardation, strokes, lung disease
or other birth defects. New evidence also suggests that cocaine use dur-
ing pregnancy may increase the risk of Sudden Infant Death Syndrome
by fifteen percent." 5 Therefore, the toxicity of the chemical used and
the extent of the exposure will be relevant in making determinations
regarding the status of the child. However, as presented below, the
child does not necessarily have to be damaged to be considered ne-
glected. It may be enough that the mother subjected the child to a risk
of imminent harm.
D. Child's Addiction as prima facie Evidence of Neglect
The fact that a child is born having narcotic withdrawal symptoms
has been held to be prima facie evidence of neglect."16 In one case, a
mother's parental rights were terminated five weeks after the child's
birth. In that case, the court found that "the fact that the child suffered
from drug withdrawal at birth constituted strong evidence in itself of
neglect.""17 There were other factors which the court considered in af-
firming the termination. This case is a good example of the multiplicity
of problems often co-existing with drug abuse.
V. PARENT'S DRUG OR ALCOHOL ABUSE AS A FACTOR IN DETERMINING
MINIMAL ABILITY TO PARENT
When a parent has a chronic drug or alcohol dependency, this may
be a factor in determining that a child is neglected. Although one inci-
113. See Parts I and II.
114. Einstein, The Interface of Drugs, Genetics, and Man, Part I: Drug Actions/Effects, Manner
of Use, Organismic Factors, and Ethical Issues and Considerations, 20 INr'LJ. ADDiciONS 771-82
(1985).
115. Placing Infants at Risk: Parental Addiction and Disease, Children's Hospital National Medi-
cal Center, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986) (testimony of Ira J. Chasnoff) [hereinafter Chas-
noff's testimony].
116. In re Vanesa F., 76 Misc. 2d 617, 351 N.Y.S.2d 337 (1974).
117. In re Gentry, 142 Mich. App. 701, 369 N.W.2d 889 (1985).
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dent of a parent's misuse of drugs is unlikely to be sufficient evidence
that her child is neglected, repeated substance abuse is often a deter-
mining factor. 118 Courts have found that drug abuse which interferes
with a parent's ability to care for her children is relevant in adjudicating
a child as neglected. 1 9 One court found a mother's drug abuse to be
relevant during the adjudication even though the reported drug use oc-
curred six and one-half months prior to the filing of the neglect
petition. 12
0
Some parents are financially, psychologically, physically, or emo-
tionally unable or unwilling to focus on anything other than their next
"fix." A parent cannot provide the safe, nurturing environment neces-
sary for a child to thrive when he is preoccupied with his drug habit. A
parent who experiences seizures, hallucinations, or unconsciousness
may expose the child to even greater harm. A parent under the influ-
ence of drugs may be unaware of or unresponsive to a child's most basic
physical and emotional needs, endangering the child's condition and de-
velopment. Generally, the younger the child the greater the justification
for concern about responding to basic needs for nurturance and
protection.
As in cases in which the parent suffers from mental illness, it is ap-
propriate to view drug addiction or alcoholism as a capacity issue, rather
than one of blame. Since the civil court process involves determining
the child's status, "guilt" or "innocence" of the parent is not at issue.
Through intervention and treatment, it is hoped that the parent will gain
the strength necessary to adequately provide for the child. Always rele-
vant to the extent of the state's intervention will be the severity of the
parent's addiction. Often relevant is the willingness to be treated. To
overcome the problem, the parent needs a recognition of the problem
and a desire to change. In many cases, a parent may express strong
motivation to stop addictive behaviors, but simply not be able to change.
The courts must also consider incapacity to change.
At the adjudication, the statutory language which is usually applica-
ble in these cases is "failure to provide proper parental care." Analysis
of the parent's prognosis comes in at the disposition, rather than at the
adjudicatory stage.12'
In cases where the child has been injured by drug abuse or for an-
other reason has been disabled, it may be relevant to examine the par-
ent's ability to meet the higher level of caretaking needed for a child
with special needs. While a parent with certain limitations may be capa-
ble of providing minimally adequate care for a normal child, she may not
be able to provide adequate care for a child born with medical problems
or physical or mental disabilities.
118. See In re S.D., 549 P.2d 1190 (Alaska 1976); H. DAVIDSON & R. HOROWITZ: LEGAL
RIGHTS OF CHILDREN, 284 (1984).
119. In re Gomez, 53 11. App. 3d 353, 368 N.E.2d 775 (1977) (citing In re Stilley, 66 11.
2d 515, 363 N.E.2d 820 (1977)).
120. Id.
121. Horowitz, supra note 5.
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A. Parental Addiction as Affecting Impulse Control
If a parent has a chronic history of violence or poor impulse control,
for example with respect to sexual drives, substance abuse can create a
substantial risk of harm to a child by impairing whatever internal con-
trols are available to the parent.
B. Parental Addiction as a Predictive Factor in Child Abuse
Studies have been done connecting substance abuse to child
abuse. 122 The correlation between drug and alcohol misuse and child
abuse or neglect ranges as high as 83 percent. 123 The question may
arise as to whether a person is a "high risk parent," and therefore likely
to abuse the child. Clearly, a child may not be adjudicated to be ne-
glected on the basis of statistics. However, drug addiction and misuse is
certainly a factor to consider in determining a parent's fitness in the
sense of having the minimal capacity necessary to care for a child. The
link between child abuse and substance abuse "must still be regarded as
one of association and not causation."' 124 As there is rarely only one
issue present in abuse cases, the addiction of the parent becomes one of
the considerations. Drug addiction may well be an indication of other
individual or family problems.
In assessing the risk to an infant, doctors in Newborn Services at
Boston City Hospital listed the following factors to consider:
Age of mother- Mothers younger than 18 or older than 30
represent a high risk.
Length of drug use- The shorter the period of time the
mother has used drugs, the less is the risk.
Presence in a drug program- Participation in a drug pro-
gram reduces risk factors, when viewed in light of the next two
criteria.
Reason for entering drug program- The lowest risk is in wo-
men who voluntarily enter a program with voiced concerns for
the well being of their fetus. The highest risk is the woman
who enters a program under court order.
Drug usage while on methadone- The lowest risk is the wo-
man who uses no drugs while receiving methadone.
Home situation- The lowest risk is the woman living with
older family members, none of whom is using drugs. The risk
is variable when she is living alone or with her husband, de-
pending on the woman's own stability and that of the relation-
ship with her husband.
Ability to raise other children- The lowest risk is the woman
who has raised other children without problems. The highest
risk is where previous children have been raised away from the
122. B. BELL, PHYSICAL ABUSE AND NEGLECT OF CHILDREN IN THE FAMILY: A REVIEW OF
PSYCHOSOCIAL FACTORS (1985).
123. Bensel, Assessing the dynamics of child abuse and neglect, 1984 Juv. & FAM. CT. J. 37.
124. Bell, supra note 131.
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mother.'
2 5
Based on their experience, the physicians found that the greatest risk is
to the child born to a woman who has abused drugs for many years, has
not entered a treatment program and shows no signs of dealing with her
addiction. In these cases, petitions were immediately filed at the time of
the child's birth to allow the state to intervene to protect the child.
In August of 1986, Congress amended the Public Health Services
Act (1986 Act).' 2 6 The 1986 Act addressed the issues of the confidenti-
ality of patient records and reporting of suspected child abuse. Prior to
these amendments, federal laws permitted disclosure of records of the
identity, diagnosis, prognosis, or treatment; only with patient consent,
to meet medical emergencies, to facilitate research and audits, and pur-
suant to appropriate court orders. This state of affairs created a conflict
with state laws requiring reporting of suspected cases of child abuse and
neglect.
The 1986 Act creates an exception to the blanket confidentiality
protection for drug abuse patient records for child abuse and neglect
reporting. Therefore, federally funded alcohol and drug programs now
must report suspected child abuse pursuant to state reporting laws.
Information beyond the reporting of the abuse is protected from
disclosure. However, the records may be released if authorized by a
court order after application showing good cause. 12 7 Such good cause
may be found in a neglect proceeding in which the statutory privilege of
confidentiality must give way to protect the best interests of the child
when such information is necessary and material to a determination of
the neglect issue.
128
C. Parent's Addiction as prima facie Evidence of Neglect
In New York, a statute in the Family Court Act specifically provides
for prima facie evidence of neglect in cases where there is direct evi-
dence of a parent's addiction:
Proof that a person repeatedly uses a drug, to the extent that it
has or would ordinarily have the effect of producing in the user
thereof a substantial state of stupor, unconsciousness, intoxica-
tion, hallucination, disorientation, or incompetence, or a sub-
stantial impairment ofjudgment, or a substantial manifestation
of irrationality, shall be prima facie evidence that a child of or
who is the legal responsibility of such person is a neglected
child. 1
29
125. Rothstein & Gould, Born with a habit: Infants of drng-addicted mothers, 21 PEDIATRIC
CLINICS OF N. Am. 318 (1974).
126. 42 U.S.C. § 290(e)(3) (amended by § 106 Pub-law 99-401).
127. Id.
128. See In re Dwayne G., 97 Misc. 2d 333, 411 N.Y.S.2d 180 (1978). See also Saltzman,
Protection for the child or the parent? The conflict between the Federal Drug and Alcohol Abuse Confi-
dentiality Requirements and the State Child Abuse and Neglect Reporting Laws, 1985 S. ILL. U. L.J.
181.
129. N.Y. Fain. Ct. Act § 1046(a)(iii) (McKinney 1983).
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The extent of addiction described here specifically points to a condition
so severe that it is almost inevitable that the child will not be cared for
adequately. However, exceptions exist. Therefore, the proof is consid-
ered prima facie evidence instead of a presumption.13 0 In contrast to a
presumption where the evidence must be rebutted, prima facie evidence
may be disregarded by the court even if contrary evidence is not
presented.'
3 '
D. Neglect During Pregnancy Implies Neglect After Birth
A crucial determination to be made in cases of neonatal addiction is
whether neglect during pregnancy indicates that the child will be ne-
glected after birth. The concept of "prospective harm" has been upheld
in cases where neglect or abuse to a sibling is used as a basis for a later-
born child's adjudication and even termination. 132 Similar reasoning
has led courts to hold that a finding of child neglect can be made solely
based upon the prenatal conduct of the mother. 13 3 The rationale of
these cases has been explained by the court as follows. Once the fetus is
viable, the state has an important and legitimate interest in the life of the
fetus.' 3 4 Even if the child is not actually harmed by the substance abuse
during pregnancy, the mother has placed the child in a position of immi-
nent danger. For this reason, the child is neglected. 135
As the Michigan Court of Appeals clearly stated:
Since prior treatment of one child can support neglect allega-
tions regarding another child, we believe that prenatal treat-
ment can be considered probative of a child's neglect as well.
We hold that a newborn suffering narcotics withdrawal symp-
toms as a consequence of prenatal maternal drug addiction
may properly be considered a neglected child within the juris-
diction of the probate court.13 6
E. Neglect Based on Statutory Definitions of Neglect
The statutory criteria to make a finding of neglect typically require
that the child's physical, mental, or emotional condition has been im-
paired or is in imminent danger of being impaired as a result of the
parent's failure to exercise a minimum degree of care.13 7 Since the find-
ing of neglect may be based upon either the actual impairment or immi-
nent danger of impairment, an adjudication that the child is neglected
may be sustained even when the parent has never had actual physical
custody of the child.' 3
8
130. D. Besharov, supra note 17.
131. Id.
132. In re D.L.R., 638 P.2d 39 (Colo. 1981); In re C.R., 38 Colo. App. 252, 557 P.2d
1225 (1976); In re Cole, 274 S.W.2d 601 (Mo. App. 1955).
133. In re Smith, 128 Misc. 2d 976, 492 N.Y.S.2d 331 (1983).
134. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
135. Smith, supra note 16.
136. In re Baby X, 97 Mich. App. 111, 293 N.W.2d 736 (1980).
137. E.g., N.Y. Faro. Ct. Act § 1012 (f) (McKinney 1983).
138. In re R., 102 Misc. 2d 1, 422 N.Y.S.2d 819 (Faro. Ct. 1979).
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F. Drug Addiction Compared To Other Factors
In approaching cases in which drug addiction may be a problem, it
may be helpful to categorize the case into one of four fact patterns:
1. Drug addiction is not preventing minimally adequate child care.
2. Drug addiction only is directly endangering the child.
3. Drug addiction is essentially unrelated to child's lack of care.
4. Drug addiction and other problems are interacting to harm or
create substantial risk of harm to the child.
When a parent voluntarily agrees to court approved and ordered
services, or when a clear legal basis for involuntary intervention is estab-
lished, treatment services can make a difference. The director of the
Perinatal Center for Chemical Dependence at Northwestern University
has found that prenatal intervention for addicted women has cut the av-
erage hospitalization period for infants from four to six weeks, down to
two to three days. Not only does this reflect a decrease in health
problems and birth defects, but also represents a savings of approxi-
mately $27,000 per child. 139 This type of success, of course, depends
on the availability of specialized, and usually comprehensive, treatment
programs.
G. Handicapped Newborns. "Baby Doe Cases"
Courts before the 1980's were rarely involved in medical care deci-
sions involving handicapped newborns. 1 40 But in 1982 an Indiana case,
in which a "Baby Doe" with Down's Syndrome and a surgically correcta-
ble esophageal blockage was denied surgery and nutrition before dy-
ing, 14 1 led to federal administration attempts to influence decisions
regarding care of handicapped newborns. Specifically, attempts were
made to regulate these decisions to deny care on the basis of Section
504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.142 These attempts, however,
were struck down by the courts.'
43
"Principles of Treatment of Disabled Infants," amendments to the
federal child abuse laws which conditioned receipt of certain federal
funds upon compliance with "Baby Doe" regulations, 144 and publica-
tion of "Model Procedures for Child Protection Service Agencies Re-
sponding to Reports of Withholding Medically Indicated Treatment
from Disabled Infants with Life-Threatening Conditions" (Model Proce-
139. Chasnoff's testimony, supra note 123.
140. Robertson, Involunta-y Euthanasia of Defective Newborns: A Legal Analysis, 27 STAN. L.
REv. 213 (1975).
141. See In re Infant Doe, No. GU8204-004A (Cir. Ct. Monroe County Ind. April 12,
1982); Infant Doe v. Bloomington Hosp., 464 U.S. 961 (1983); Weber v. Stony Brook
Hosp., 95 A.D.2d 587, 467 N.Y.S.2d 685, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1027 (1983).
142. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982).
143. American Academy of Pediatrics v. Heckler, 561 F. Supp. 395 (D.D.C. 1983);
United States v. University Hosp., 729 F.2d 144 (2d. Cir. 1984), American Hosp. Ass'n v.
Heckler, 585 F. Supp. 541 (S.D.N.Y. 1984), aff'd, 794 F.2d 676 (2d. Cir. 1984).
144. Child Abuse Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-457, tit. 1, §§ 121-28, 98 Stat.
1749 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 5101-5103).
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dures) 14 5 all now influence medical decisions affecting handicapped
newborns. 1
4 6
The use of a hospital review committee, defined as "an entity estab-
lished to deal with medical and ethical dilemmas arising in the care of
patients within a hospital or health care facility,"1 47 is an important way
to facilitate the gathering of many relevant items of information.
Federal guidelines permit denial of medical care only in the follow-
ing circumstances:
(i) The infant is chronically and irreversibly comatose;
(ii) The provision of such treatment would merely prolong
dying, not be effective in ameliorating or correcting all of the
infant's life-threatening conditions, or otherwise be futile in
terms of the survival infant's; or
(iii) The provision of such treatment would be virtually futile
in terms of the survival of the infant and the treatment under
the circumstances would be inhumane.14
8
Denial of medical care under these regulations does not include de-
nial of appropriate hydration, nutrition, or medication. To the extent
that these regulations are enforced very strictly, it remains unclear to
what extent "right to die" decisions now being made by courts will be
brought to bear in ways that essentially limit the effect of the regulations
or make them inoperable. Such legal decisions hold that competent
adults can cause the removal of artificial life-sustaining devices even if it
hastens death, 149 and that even nutrition and hydration may be with-
drawn in some circumstances.' 5 0 At least one decision allowed hydra-
tion and nutrition to be withdrawn from an incompetent individual who
had been in a permanent vegetative state. 15 ' In dealing with cases of
handicapped newborns, the opinions of parents and their willingness to
consent or to deny consent to various procedures must be very carefully
weighed. The physician still must consider whether or not a handi-
capped infant is being denied care for unacceptable reasons, as well as
whether or not full informed consent procedures require the physician
to explore non-treatment options and the possibility that an infant may
have a right to die.
H. Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy
Just as a child may be denied essential care to sustain life or prevent
serious disabilities, it is possible that a parent may, at the other extreme,
145. Model Procedures for Child ProIective Services Agencies Responding to Reports of Withholding
Medically Indicated Treatment from Disabled Infants with Life- Threatening Conditions, 10 MENTAL &
PHYSICAL DISABILITIEs L. REP. 220, 245 (1986) [hereinafter Model Procedure].
146. See infra Appendix.
147. Model Procedure, supra note 145, at 219.
148. 50 Fed. Reg. 14,888 (1985).
149. Satz v. Perlmutter, 362 So. 2d 160 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978), aft'd, 379 So. 2d 359
(Fla. 1980).
150. Corbett v. d'Alessandro, No. 85-1052 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. April 18, 1986).
151. Presentation by F. Abrams, Withholding or Withdrawing Treatment When Death
is not Imminent, Rose Medical Center, Denver, Colorado, 1986 Conference.
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cause a child to receive medical procedures or attention which is entirely
inappropriate. "Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy (MSBP) is a form of
child abuse wherein the mother falsifies an illness in her child through
simulation and/or production of illness and presents the child for medi-
cal care, disclaiming knowledge as to etiology of the problem." 15 2 Over
100 cases have been documented worldwide with a short-term morbidity
rate of 100%, a long-term morbidity rate of 8%, and a mortality rate of
9%.153 Rosenberg's review of this issue is the best available current de-
scription in a clinical protocol. 154 There have been several trials involv-
ing MSBP, two of which are reported. In the first reported case, an
appeal from a criminal conviction, 15 5 the California courts had to decide
whether to recognize expert testimony on the subject. The difficulty
these cases present is illustrated by some details from the case itself. Tia
was an adopted child who went through repeated hospitalizations in the
San Francisco Bay area. The child suffered fever, vomiting, "staring
spells," and other symptoms most of which initially disappeared after
hospitalization. However, Tia always ended up back in the hospital, and
went through minor surgery, intravenous feeding, insertions of cathe-
ters, then major surgery in the form of a laparotomy to explore for tu-
mors, and a long list of other tests. After two years of intermittent
hospitalizations and procedures, Tia died. It was only after another
adopted child, Mindy, began to make appearances at hospitals display-
ing the same symptoms as Tia that physicians began to believe "that
there was no chance that two completely unrelated girls would demon-
strate the same mysterious symptoms and poisonings" and that there-
fore MSBP had to be considered as a diagnosis. The San Francisco
coroner testified that Tia's death was caused by sodium poisoning and
that the level of sodium was so high that it had to be administered into
the gastrointestinal tract. A professor of pediatrics at the University of
California agreed with this finding and stated his opinion that the so-
dium was administered through sodium bicarbonate, two or three tea-
spoons of which would have been sufficient to produce Tia's and
Mindy's symptoms. 1
5 6
In each of the hospitals to which Tia was admitted, parents were
encouraged to participate in the care of their infants and young chil-
dren; and mothers were permitted to remain overnight and to feed their
babies. Throughout Tia's hospitalizations, appellant visited frequently
and for long periods of time. Because of her dedication, she won the
admiration, sympathy, and respect of hospital staff members. Because
of her obvious intelligence, her frequent presence, and her willingness
to help, she was allowed to perform "minor nursing chores" including
the administration of formula through the nasogastric tube. The pediat-
152. Rosenberg, Web of Deceit: A Literature Review of Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy, II
CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 547-63 (1987).
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. People v. Phillips, 122 Cal. App. 3d 69, 175 Cal. Rptr. 703 (1981).
156. Id. at 719.
1988]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW
ric facility of each hospital had a small room or kitchen area, not visible
from the nursing station, which contained an unlocked refrigerator for
formulas and other foods. Appellant had access to those areas.
157
After. elaborating on the evidence and its possible relation to MSBP,
the court concluded: The following studies herein show intentional
poisoning of infants by the mothers to be another form of child abuse.
In the absence of some reason to doubt the validity, we find no abuse of
discretion in the trial court's decision to allow expert testimony based
thereon.' 58 Two subsequent cases resulted in intervention before the
child's death, and thus the possibility of a protective order.
In an older case of MSBP, apparently not appealed, little Kimberly
McKnight was hospitalized nineteen times for severe infections that doc-
tors were not able to trace. They decided the source was the child's
mother. The mother was handed a ten year prison sentence for abusing
the daughter who had not been ill since the time authorities had re-
moved her from her middle class home. Prosecutors termed the case
"among the most violent on record" and an all woman jury handed the
maximum sentence to the twenty-eight year old woman while Kimberly,
six years old and appearing healthy and active, was outside the court-
room. The girl had greeted her mother with hugs and kisses right
before Mrs. McKnight was found guilty of criminal negligence by with-
holding life-saving medication-a conviction which probably will ensure
the girl remains in the care of her paternal grandparents.
15 9
Certainly one important feature of MSBP is the reminder to all child
care and health professionals of the great range of harm that can befall
children, even in biological homes, and the warning to the open-minded
as well, about placements in non-biological homes.
IV. OTHER ISSUES
Another set of issues not thoroughly covered in this article but wor-
thy of mention, concerns medical care for older children who may also
be part of the child welfare system. Issues of informed consent to medi-
cal attention are more likely to demand attention as a child matures.
How old is old enough to consent to medical care is a question with
many answers. The answers depend, for example, on the nature of the
condition being treated, such as ordinary illness, pregnancy, or drug ha-
bituation. Questions of consent are also complicated by questions of
who has the physical or legal custody of the child.
All of these issues ultimately relate back to parental authority, gov-
ernmental authority, our changing understanding of childhood, and our
accommodation to childhood. Enumeration and clarification of chil-
dren's rights in every setting must be encouraged to assure proper at-
tention to the legitimate needs of children in a democracy.
157. Id. at 708 n.165.
158. Id. at 714.
159. The Daily Camera, April 18, 1979, at 6.
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A. Children in Placement
Also remaining to be addressed are issues such as the duty to pro-
vide appropriate medical care to children in placement, the duty owed
foster and adoptive parents to inform them about the special needs or
risks associated with children placed, and the special laws governing
consent to care by children whether in placement or not. While these
issues will not be covered in detail, professionals involved with the child
welfare system need to be aware of these matters and their implications,
including potential liability.
B. Medical Care for Children in Placement
When a state has failed to provide necessary medical and dental
care to children in placement, the state may be sued and placed under
court order to provide such care if the failure to provide care is suffi-
ciently gross.' 6 0 Both within placement and within the family, even if
the family is poor, there are numerous sources of support for medical
care. An agency must be prepared to utilize each of these resources to
the child's benefit.'
6 '
Every child needs a "medical home" for records and to ensure con-
sistent attention to his or her medical care. Consistent attention is more
difficult for children placed. Some children who are placed have never
received good medical attention. A "medical home" helps ensure that
basic health screening, recording of head circumference, dental care,
hearing and vision checks, and blood pressure monitoring will be under-
taken. Immunization and screening for certain infectious diseases are
more important concerns for children first placed in foster care than for
the average child. Developmental screening and even a psychiatric as-
sessment may be indicated for some children placed in care.
16 2
In order to ensure that medical needs are met, a social services de-
partment must have routine and ready access to physicians. This en-
sures that each child will be seen by physicians aware of the special
needs and risks associated with the child welfare population. In addi-
tion, special programs for "special needs children," such as programs
providing therapy in schools under the Education for All Handicapped
Children Act, 163 should be considered and utilized by child protective
services whenever possible.
C. Informed Consent Principles for Foster and Adoptive Parents
The development of the doctrine of informed consent in the field of
160. G.L. v. Zumwalt, 364 F. Supp. 1030 (E.D. Ky. 1973).
161. Soler, Shotton, Bell, Jameson, Schauffer & Warboys, Health Care for Low Income
Children, in REPRESENTING THE CHILD CLIENT (1987).
162. L. MICHAELS, R. KRUGMAN, & D. BROSS, MEDICAL ISSUES FOR CHILD PROTECTIVE
SERVICE WORKERS (University of Colorado, Denver, C. Henry Kempe National Center for
the Prevention and Treatment of Child Abuse and Neglect 1988).
163. 20 U.S.C. § 1400 (1983).
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medicine has already been discussed. 164 A comparable set of principles
may be developing within the field of child welfare with respect to the
information owed to foster and adoptive parents about the needs and
nature of a child being placed in their care. For example, a child with an
infectious disease placed without adequate screening or without inform-
ing the placement parents of the risk, could produce harm. 16 5 Exposing'
a pregnant foster parent to rubella or cytomegalo virus is an example of
this type of risk. Information about the known behavioral risks associated
with a given child is a comparable issue. While reported cases dealt with
physical assault of a foster parent where the tendency was known before
placement, 16 6 the same line of reasoning could lead to liability for a fail-
ure to warn that a child who was sexually abused exhibited strong ten-
dencies towards sexual assault.
Another type of informed consent issue is associated with providing
biological, foster, or adoptive parents with the data which will allow
them to decide to permit or deny any medical care for the child which
they are legally allowed to permit or deny. Protective services agencies
that deal with legal custody of a child must also be aware that not all
medical care for children requires the consent, or even the knowledge,
of the legal custodian. Clear understanding of the principles of guardi-
anship, custodial care, and the rules governing substituted consent is
essential for the protective services agency. Ready access to a lawyer in
consent matters in unclear cases is a necessity. A few of the special is-
sues in consent cases are listed in the following section.
D. Special Issues of Consent
It is not always recognized by child protection professionals or phy-
sicians that there are a number of exceptions to the usual rules of con-
sent to medical care for children. In Colorado, a state statute sets the
age of competence at age eighteen for signing most enforceable con-
tracts, including a contract for medical care. 16 7 However, "a minor fif-
teen years of age or older who is living separate and apart from his
parent, parents, or legal guardian, with or without the consent of his
parent, parents, or guardian, and is managing his own financial affairs,
regardless of the source of his income" may consent to his own medical,
dental or surgical care. 168 A minor who is lawfully married, 169 or a mi-
nor who is a parent,' 70 may also give lawful consent for medical care to
himself or his child.
Without age being specified, minors may request and consent to
164. Supra note 90.
165. Seavy v. State, 21 A.D.2d 445, 250 N.Y.S.2d 877, aft'd, N.Y.2d 675, 216 N.E.2d
613, 269 N.Y.S.2d 455 (1964).
166. Snyder v. Manser, 149 Ind. App. 334, 272 N.E.2d 627 (1971);Johnson v. State, 69
Cal. 2d 782, 447 P.2d 352, 73 Cal. Rptr. 240 (1968).
167. COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-22-101 (1987).
168. COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-22-103(1) (1987).
169. Id.
170. COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-22-103(3) (1987).
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birth control "procedures, supplies or information." 171 While the pres-
ent Colorado statute requires that a parent, guardian or spouse, if mar-
ried, also request an abortion for a minor who wishes the procedure,'
7 2
parental consent for a minor's abortion was held unconstitutional by the
Federal District Court for Colorado in 1975,173 and similar provisions
for parental or spousal consent have been struck down by the United
States Supreme Court.1
74
With no age specified, a minor in Colorado may consent to medical
care and treatment for drug addiction. 175 Finally, a minor fifteen or
older may request hospitalization for mental illness.1
76
V. CONCLUSION
The authority of parents, duties of caring professions and their
agencies, and the underlying rights of children all must be balanced by
the legal system. Under the law, each of the professions has specific
duties. For example, medical diagnoses provide important data to the
child welfare system, and physicians and social workers must consider all
of the ways in which medical issues are related to documenting or re-
jecting a need for intervention. This article has focused primarily on
ways in which medical diagnosis may lead to a child's involvement in the
child welfare system.
However, children are brought into the child welfare system for rea-
sons other than a medical diagnosis. Other reasons include voluntary
placement by a parent, abandonment, or a determination that a child is
beyond parental control. Placement itself is associated with another set
of medical-legal issues, including the need for agencies to secure ade-
quate medical and dental care, and to inform foster and adoptive par-
ents of any special medical conditions of children placed in their care.
The authority of parents, statutory duties of caring professions and
their agencies, and the underlying rights of children all must be bal-
anced by the legal system. Under the law, each of the professions, child
welfare, physicians, and attorneys, has specific duties. For example,
medical diagnoses provide important data to the child welfare system,
and physicians and social workers must consider all of the ways in which
medical issues are related to documenting a need for intervention.
How old is old enough to consent to medical care is a question with
many answers. The answers depend, for example, on the nature of the
condition being treated, such as ordinary illness, pregnancy, or drug ad-
diction. Questions of consent are also complicated by questions of who
had the physical or legal custody of the child. All of these issues ulti-
mately relate back to parental authority, governmental authority, our
171. COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-22-105 (1987).
172. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-6-101 (1986).
173. Foe v. Vanderhoof, 389 F. Supp. 947 (D. Colo. 1975).
174. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
175. COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-22-102 (1987).
176. COLO. REV. STAT. § 27-10-103(1) (1982).
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changing understanding of childhood, and our changing accommoda-
tion to the importance of childhood to individuals and society.
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APPENDIX
Information Needed for CPS Assessment of Child's Status
Is the child at the hospital?
What is the child's age?
What are the child's diagnoses?
Is the child's life endangered?
What is the life or health-threatening problem requiring treatment?
Are immediate actions necessary to keep the child alive?
Has withholding of life-sustaining treatment been implemented?
Have the parents refused consent to life-sustaining treatment? Will
the hospital choose to sustain life-support care for the immediate future
(24 to 72) hours while the CPS investigation is underway?
Is sustenance (food or water, whether given orally or through an
intravenous or nasogastric tube) or medication being denied?
If so, on what basis?
What, precisely, is the treatment (necessary for the child's life or
health) that is being denied?
What treatment or sustenance, if any, is being provided the child?
How certain are the medical diagnoses among the treatment team?
Is there unanimity among treating physicians and consultants about
treatment and diagnosis?
Have there been any other opinions, and what are they?
Who has been consulted and what are their qualifications?
What are the conclusions of the consultants?
If there has been consultation, did it include an examination of the
child?
Who has discussed the case with the parents?
What are the proposed treatments?
Who has proposed them?
What is the prognosis without the proposed treatments?
What is the prognosis with the proposed treatments?
What is the complexity, risk and novelty of the proposed
treatments?
What is the clarity of professional opinion as to what is standard
and accepted practice?
Has a hospital review process taken place?
What was the review process?
What were its recommendations?
Is treatment medically indicated?
Who, if anyone, has concluded that:
the child is irreversibly and chronically comatose, the provision
of treatment would merely prolong dying, not be effective in
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ameliorating or correcting all of the infant's life threatening
conditions, or otherwise be futile in terms of the survival of the
infant?, or the provision of such treatment would be virtually
futile in terms of the survival of the infant and the treatment
itself under such circumstances would be inhumane?
Information Needed to Assess Parental Decision Making
Is there one or two parents of record?
If two, do they agree on the course of action to be followed?
Has the responsible physician recommended treatment for which
the parents have refused consent?
Were the parents presented with all treatment options?
Was information about treatment options and the prognosis of the
child withheld from the parents or presented to them in an incomplete
form or in a misleading pessimistic light?
Did the parents understand the information?
What was the nature and degree of parental involvement in the de-
cisions to deny treatment or sustenance?
What are the parents' views of the child's problem?
What are the parents' major concerns for their child?
Do the parents feel they are being asked to consent to treatment
which is inhumane?
What is the basis of the parents' refusal to consent to treatment?
Have appropriate counseling services been made available?
Were the parents provided information to facilitate access to serv-
ices furnished by parent support group, and public and private agencies
concerned with resources for disabled persons and their families?
Were the parents provided an opportunity to speak with other par-
ents of children with similar conditions?
Did the parents participate in or have access to the result of the
hospital review process?
Would the parents agree to consultation with the hospital review
committee?
If they will not agree to treatment, are the parents likely to relin-
quish custody of the child?
Information Needed to Assess Hospital Review Committee
Is there a hospital review committee [HRC]?
Did the HRC verify the diagnosis?
Were all the facts explained to the parent(s)?
Were alternatives explored with the parent(s)?
Did the parent(s) appear at the meeting and have the opportunity to
articulate their objections about treatment before the committee?
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Were all the relevant facts before the committee?
Did all physicians, nurses and others involved in treatment have an
opportunity to present information to the committee?
Did the committee recommend treatment or make any other
recommendation?
Was there any significant disagreement among committee members
(and/or medical staff)? What was this disagreement?
Was this committee recommendation consistent with the terms of
"withholding of medically indicated treatment"?' 77
177. Model Procedures for Child Protective Services Agencies Responding to Reports of Withholding
Medically Indicated Treatment from Disabled Infants with Life- Threatening Conditions, 10 MENrA &
PHYsICA. DISABILiTIEs L. REP. 220, 245 (1986).
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